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Spinoza’s Essentialism in the Short Treatise
Valtteri Viljanen
Introduction
It is not, as such, very contentious to read Spinoza as a clear proponent of 
metaphysical essentialism. But the extent to which his thought revolves around 
essences, or natures, in the early Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being 
is, I believe, nevertheless striking. In what follows, I attempt to trace the rather 
consistent essentialist thread that runs through the whole work. This allows 
us not only to better understand the work itself  but also to obtain a firmer 
grasp of the nature of Spinoza’s entire philosophical enterprise. In many ways, 
the essentialism we find in the Short Treatise is in line with Spinoza’s mature 
thought; but there are also significant differences, and discerning them throws 
light on the development of Spinoza’s philosophy.
The Basic Features of Essences
Right from the abrupt start of the Short Treatise, much of Spinoza’s argumen-
tation relies on a particular notion of essence or nature.1 The very first note is 
especially revealing:
Understand the definite nature [natuur], by which the thing is what it is, 
and which cannot in any way be taken from it without destroying it, as 
it belongs to the essence [wezen] of  a mountain to have a valley, or the 
essence of a mountain is that it has a valley. This is truly eternal and 
1 Here, as elsewhere in Spinoza’s works, I understand Spinoza to use the two terms inter-
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immutable, and must always be in the concept of a mountain, even if  it 
does not exist, and never did.2
Thus, it can be said that essences are, for Spinoza, those features of reality that 
make things the individuals they are.3 The passage also makes clear that there 
is a close linkage between essences and the concepts of things that have those 
essences. From the Ethics we know that Spinoza came to endorse the (tradi-
tional) view that each thing has a definition that expresses the essence of the 
thing. Short Treatise is less explicit about this, but we do find clear indications 
that this is, in fact, something that Spinoza presupposes already in the early 
work. Consider, for instance, the following:
But since we do not have, of the remaining attributes, such a knowledge 
as we have of extension, let us see whether, having regard to the modes 
of extension, we can discover a more particular definition, which is more 
suited to express the essence of  our soul.4
Evidently, a definition captures the concept of its object and thereby expresses 
the essence of that object. And as the first quote evinces, these concepts do not 
contain anything temporal in them; that a mountain must have a valley “must 
always be in the concept of a mountain.”5
The beginning of the Short Treatise illuminates other important aspects of 
Spinoza’s essentialism as well. Spinoza writes:
Whatever we clearly and distinctly understand to belong [behooren] to the 
nature of a thing, we can truly affirm of that thing.6
And slightly later in a marginal note, we can read the following:
That other Ideas [of things other than infinite attributes] exist is, indeed, 
possible, but not necessary. But whether they exist or not, their essence 
is always necessary like the Idea of a triangle, or that of the soul’s love 
without the body, etc., so that even if  I thought at first that I had feigned 
them, afterwards I would still be forced to say that they are and would 
be no less the same, even if  neither I nor any other man had ever thought 
of them. That is why they are not feigned by me, and also must have 
2 KV I 1 | G I/15/21–26 | C 61.
3 It should be noted that these features are, as the passage states, eternal and immutable; 
cf.: “[T] he essence of a thing is immutable” (KV II 15 | G I/80/6–7 | C 121).
4 KV app 2 | G I/120/7–11 | C 155, emphasis added.
5 KV I 1 | G I/15/25–26 | C 61. Cf.: “As note 1 says, a mountain without a valley, for example, 
would cease to be a mountain, and that is why the valley belongs [. . .] to the nature of the moun-
tain” (Boss, L’enseignement de Spinoza, 9).
6 KV I 1 | G I/15/9–11 | C 61, emphasis added.
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a subject [subjectum] outside me, which is not me, a subject without which 
they cannot be.7
So I see now that the truth, essence or existence of any thing does not 
depend on me. For as has been shown in connection with the second kind 
of Ideas, they are what they are without me, whether according to their 
essence alone or according to their essence and existence together. I find 
this to be true also—indeed much more so—of this third, unique idea [of 
a necessary being]: not only does it not depend on me, but on the contrary 
he alone must be the subject of what I affirm of him, so that if he did not 
exist, I would not be able to affirm anything at all of him, though I can do 
this of other things, even if  they do not exist. [I find] also that he must be 
the subject of all other things.8
Read together, the upshot is that what can be affirmed of a thing is affirmed of 
a subject. This can be read as a sign of Spinoza endorsing an important element 
of the traditional substance/accident ontology. In it, substances, or things, are 
subjects of accidents that can be predicated of substances. Further evidence 
for this can be found later in the first part of the Short Treatise, when Spinoza 
contends:
[W] e have already found previously that there must be an infinite and 
perfect being, by which nothing else can be understood but a being of 
which all in all must be predicated [een wezen, van ‘t welke alles in allen 
moet gezeid worden]. For of a being which has some essence, [some] 
attributes must be predicated, and the more essence one ascribes to it, the 
more attributes one must also ascribe to it.9
So obviously, the “all in all” does not consist of essential features only. Thus, 
more seems to “belong” to the nature of a thing than only those features con-
stitutive of it, namely also attributes or things that come with the essence—in 
traditional terms, accidents. For Spinoza’s God, of course, finite things also 
count among these accompanying features. Attributes, properties, or features 
always have a subject—presumably, some particular thing—of which they can 
be predicated.10 Moreover, those subjects exist outside the cognitive agent.11 
7 KV I 1 | G I/17/15–21 | C 63, emphases added.
8 KV I 1 | G I/17/25–33 | C 63, emphases added.
9 KV I 2 | G I/23/18–24 | C 69–70, emphasis added.
10 In this respect, the Short Treatise has much to offer to the discussion concerning predica-
tion (see, e.g., Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, chap. 1; Jarrett, “The Concepts of Substance and 
Mode in Spinoza”; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, chap. 4; Carriero, “On the Relationship 
Between Mode and Substance in Spinoza’s Metaphysics”; Melamed, “Spinoza’s Metaphysics of 
Substance”; Viljanen, “Spinoza’s Ontology”).
11 Cf. note 24 below.
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From this we can draw the conclusion, I think, that also essences always must 
have a subject; they must be essences of some thing.
To summarize what Spinoza has taught us thus far, things are the individ-
uals they are in virtue of essences, immutable and eternal features of reality 
capturable by a definition, the bearers of which are subjects of predication. 
However, Spinoza says little to explicate why he so quickly introduces essences 
in the Short Treatise, so an explication of this cannot but remain somewhat 
conjectural. I would like to suggest that, unlike for many of us, it never was a 
live option for him to think that reality might not have true structure, intelligi-
bility, and stability. Or, to put it differently, I do not believe that Spinoza ever 
seriously entertained taking what may be called the Heraclitean route; rather, 
he works within the Platonic framework (in a wide sense). From this point of 
departure, it certainly seems evident that there must be something responsible 
for the intelligibility and identity of things—certain features of reality itself.12 
And Spinoza calls these features essences or natures, obviously feeling no need 
to revise the traditional philosophical landscape in this respect. If  this is, at 
least roughly, an appropriate line of interpretation, it is in fact rather under-
standable that these features cannot be temporal entities that go in and out of 
existence:  this would disqualify them from being objects of real knowledge, 
that is, of true cognition that can be had only of permanent things. Thus, the 
definitions of essences cannot contain temporal determinations in them, for 
otherwise the very core of things would be out of the reach of our intellect—an 
intolerable situation for anyone convinced that reality is cognizable with our 
intellect.
A further notable feature of the essentialism of the Short Treatise is its 
rather straightforward endorsement of the view that essences are individual, 
unique to their possessors:
But we have rightly regarded this as indicating their ignorance; for all 
and only the particulars have a cause, not the universals, because they are 
nothing.
God, then, is a cause of, and provider for, only particular things. So if  
particular things have to agree with another nature, they will not be able 
to agree with their own, and consequently will not be able to be what 
they truly are. E.g., if  God had created all men like Adam was before 
the fall, then he would have created only Adam, and not Peter or Paul. 
But God’s true perfection is that he gives all things their essence, from 
the least to the greatest; or to put it better, he has everything perfect in 
himself.13
12 For more on this, see my Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, 10–11.
13 KV I 6 | G I/43/5–17 | C 87, emphases added.
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To my mind, the way in which Spinoza shifts from the denial of universals to 
talking about particular things and God giving “all things their essence, from 
the least to the greatest” is most easily understood as follows: each and every 
particular thing is endowed with its individual essence, whereas strictly speak-
ing there are no universals and thus no essences common to many things.14 
Moreover, the “from the least to the greatest” passage suggests that there is a 
continuum of  individual essences. Perhaps one could say that a certain area in 
that continuum is such that its occupants can be called, for instance, human 
beings, most probably because they share certain features (such as a complex 
structure of bodies in a certain ratio of motion and rest).
More evidence for this reading can be found in the second part of the Short 
Treatise:
That belongs to the nature of a thing without which the thing can neither 
exist nor be understood: but this is not sufficient; it must be in such a way 
that the proposition is always convertible, viz. that what is said also can 
neither be nor be understood without the thing.15
This, of course, is the forerunner of E2d2, which definitely pushes the reader to 
regard essences as individual—and has, in fact, generally been taken as a piece 
of evidence for the individuality of essences.16
Indeed, I believe that all the aforementioned features of Spinoza’s essential-
ism can be found unchanged in the Ethics as well, even though the definition of 
essence comes as late as in the beginning of the second part of the masterpiece. 
It can thus be observed that the Short Treatise displays some of its author’s 
essentialist tendencies more openly than the Ethics (for instance, that eternal 
and immutable essences form a crucial starting point for proper philosophy, 
and that things can be predicated of other things) and others less openly (that 
definitions express essences and that from these definable essences many things 
necessarily follow).
The Ontological Status of Essences
The aforesaid sheds light on what Spinoza means by essences. However, rela-
tively little, if  anything, has been said about the ontological status of essences. 
Are they real entities? Or perhaps beings of reason? How do the essences of 
finite things relate to that of God? In what follows, I attempt to provide some 
answers to these questions.
14 In “The Framework of Essences in Spinoza’s Ethics,” Christopher Martin calls the latter 
“species-essences.”
15 KV II pref. | G I/53/30–34 | C 94.
16 See, e.g., Martin, “The Framework of Essences.”
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As far as I  can see, in the Short Treatise the first—and rather puzzling— 
statement concerning these issues is located in a marginal note to the second 
chapter:
To say here that the nature of the thing required this [limitation], and 
therefore it could not be otherwise, is to say nothing. For the nature of 
the thing cannot require anything unless it exists. If  you say that one can 
nevertheless see what belongs to the nature of a thing that does not exist, 
that is true as regards existence, but not at all as regards essence.
In this lies the difference between creating and generating: creating, then, 
is bringing a thing about as regards essence and existence together; but in 
generating a thing comes about as regards existence only. Therefore, there 
is no creating in Nature, but only generating.
So if  God creates, he creates the nature of the thing together with the 
thing. And so he would be envious if  (being able but not willing) he had 
created the thing in such a way that it would not agree with its cause in 
essence and existence.
But what we here call creating cannot really be said to have ever happened, 
and we mention it only to show what we can say about it, once we make 
the distinction between creating and generating.17
Now it may be asked, how can Spinoza say that “the nature of a thing cannot 
require anything unless it exists”? And what does the next sentence, “[i] f  you 
say that one can nevertheless see what belongs to the nature of a thing that 
does not exist, that is true as regards existence, but not at all as regards essence,” 
mean? And why is creation not possible, only generation? As it is, the note 
appears rather mysterious, obviously resting on a number of presuppositions.
I would suggest that the note turns on a specific theory about the relation-
ship between God’s attributes and finite things. According to this theory, finite 
things are contained in the attributes. The latter appendix to the Short Treatise 
states this in unambiguous terms: “But it should be noted in addition that these 
modes, when considered as not really existing, are nevertheless equally con-
tained [begreepen] in their attributes.”18 Moreover, and in line with the tenet 
that essences form the core of things, Spinoza states precisely that essences are 
contained in the attributes. For instance, the following passage indicates this:
The true essence of an object is something which is really distinct from 
the Idea of that object, and this something (by a3) either exists really, or is 
contained in another thing which exists really and from which one cannot 
distinguish this essence really, but only modally; such are all the essences 
17 KV I 2 | G I/20/23–38 | C 67.
18 KV app 2 | G I/119/20–23 | C 154–155.
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of things we see which, when they did not previously exist, were contained in 
extension, motion and rest, and which, when they do exist, are distinguished 
from extension not really, but only modally.19
So all the essences of bodies were contained in extension already before their 
existence; and even existing bodies are only modally distinct from their attri-
bute. Moreover, in the attribute of thought there are ideas that “track” precisely 
the essences of things of different attributes (such as extension): “[N] o thing 
is in God’s infinite intellect unless it exists formally in Nature[.]”20 Moreover:
That the most immediate mode of the attribute we call thought has 
objectively in itself  the formal essence of all things, so that if  one 
posited any formal things whose essence did not exist objectively in the 
above-named attribute, it would not be infinite or supremely perfect in 
its kind[.] 21
This, in fact, is Spinoza’s point of departure for the explanation he gives in 
the Short Treatise of  the mind-body union; however, discussing it would take 
us too far afield.22 For the present purposes, it suffices that we note that the 
essences of things are contained in the attributes, and of those essences the 
immediate mode of the attribute of thought forms ideas, whereby become con-
stituted also human minds.
This is not the only occurrence of the containment theory of essences in 
early Spinoza. In the Metaphysical Thoughts we find the following passage:
Hence we can easily reply to the questions that are usually raised 
concerning essence. These questions are as follows:  whether essence 
is distinguished from existence? and if  it is distinguished, whether it is 
anything different from the idea? and if  it is something different from an 
idea, whether it has any being outside the intellect? The last of these must 
surely be granted.
To the first question we reply by making a distinction: in God essence is 
not distinguished from existence, since his essence cannot be conceived 
without existence; but in other things it does differ from and certainly can 
be conceived without existence. To the second we say that a thing that is 
conceived clearly and distinctly, or truly, outside the intellect is something 
different from the idea.
But again it is asked whether that being outside the intellect is by itself  or 
has been created by God. To this we reply that the formal essence neither 
19 KV app 1, p4d | G I/116/8–17 | C 152, emphasis added.
20 KV I 2 | G I/22/14–16 | C 68–69.
21 KV app 2 | G I/117/18–23 | C 152–153.
22 For an interpretation of the mind-body union that coheres well, I believe, with the account 
given in the Short Treatise, see Koistinen, “Desire and Good in Spinoza,” 222–223.
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is by itself nor has been created, for both these presuppose that the thing 
actually exists. Rather it depends on the divine essence alone, in which all 
things are contained. So in this sense we agree with those who say that the 
essences of things are eternal.23
This is very much in line with what we have seen Spinoza claim in the Short 
Treatise. Essences are real entities, but not independent of the attributes.24 It 
thus seems to be one of Spinoza’s most deeply entrenched convictions that 
finite things are modes—entities of a particular subclass of properties or quali-
ties, namely such that they cannot be or be conceived without the attribute 
which they modify (evidently through their essences). To contrast this with a 
very different type of (necessary) property: for instance, hotness was tradition-
ally seen to always follow from fire, and the former most certainly can be or be 
conceived without the latter. So understandably, it is through God “all things 
that have any essence [. . .] are what they are[.] ”25
A particularly interesting feature of Spinoza’s attribute/mode ontology in 
the Short Treatise finds an expression in the following passage:
And because there is no inequality at all in the attributes, nor in the 
essences of the modes, there can be no particularity in the Idea, since it 
is not in Nature. But whenever any of these modes put on their particular 
existence, and by that are in some way distinguished from their attributes 
(because their particular existence, which they have in the attribute, is 
then the subject of their essence), then a particularity presents itself in the 
essences of the modes, and consequently in their objective essences, which 
are necessarily contained in the Idea.26
The thesis is thus that only when things become actual, or when they are gen-
erated into actuality, essences come to be distinguished from each other. This 
claim is in interesting tension with 2p8 of the Ethics. That proposition states, 
“[t] he ideas of singular things, or of  modes, that do not exist must be compre-
hended in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of the 
23 CM I 2 | G I/238–239 | C 304–305, latter emphasis added.
24 But they are independent of the cognitive agent; recall:
But whether they exist or not, their essence is always necessary like the Idea of a triangle, 
or that of the soul’s love without the body, etc., so that even if  I thought at first that I had 
feigned them, afterwards I would still be forced to say that they are and would be no less the 
same, even if neither I nor any other man had ever thought of them. That is why they are not 
feigned by me, and also must have a subject outside me, which is not me, a subject without 
which they cannot be. (KV I 1 | G I/17/15–21 | C 63, emphasis added)
For an argument that Spinoza is here developing further the line of thought Descartes pres-
ents in the Fifth Meditation, see my Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, chap. 1.
25 KV II 18 | G I/88/9–10 | C 128.
26 KV app 2 | G I/119/23–32 | C 155, emphases added.
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singular things, or modes, are contained in God’s attributes.” The corollary is 
also instructive:
From this it follows that so long as singular things do not exist, except insofar 
as they are comprehended in God’s attributes, their objective being, or ideas, 
do not exist except insofar as God’s infinite idea exists. And when singular 
things are said to exist, not only insofar as they are comprehended in God’s 
attributes, but insofar also as they are said to have duration, their ideas also 
involve the existence through which they are said to have duration.27
Now it is one thing to say that ideas of non-actual things exist only in God’s 
infinite idea and have duration only when their objects have duration, and quite 
another to say that the essences that are the objects of ideas are not distin-
guished from each other until they become actualized. In fact, given that the 
whole point of E2p8 is to show how we can have ideas of non-actual things, 
the proposition would not get off  the ground without the premise that essences 
that are comprehended in attributes alone can be distinguished from each 
other. What Spinoza says in E2p8 (and its corollary and scholium) clearly 
presupposes that (formal) essences are distinct and thereby can be objects of 
ideas even when they are not actual. I would suggest that this difference stems 
from the fact that still in the Short Treatise, Spinoza was rather far from the 
full-fledged theory of the eternal and temporal realms on which much of the 
Ethics is built.28 So from early on, Spinoza endorsed the view that essences 
are contained in the attributes; however, this view underwent some important 
changes. To my mind, the Metaphysical Thoughts indicates that formal essences 
rather rapidly gained a more robust ontological status,29 their identity not being 
really dependent on temporal matters from that work onward.
Essences and Causality
Quite early in the Short Treatise, Spinoza states that “no thing through itself  
[door zig zelfs] seeks its own destruction[.] ”30 The phrase “through itself” already 
27 E2p8c.
28 I would thus agree with Martial Gueroult and Charles Jarrett. The former argues that in the 
Short Treatise, the essence of a mode “is absorbed in the undifferentiated being of the attribute” 
(Spinoza II, 99), but in the Ethics essences have “actual reality distinct from the actual reality of 
their existence” (p. 101). The latter notes that the passage of the second appendix to the Short 
Treatise is “evidently a precursor” of E2p8, 2p8c, and 2p8s and comments on it as follows: “Unlike 
the doctrine of the E[thics], however, his position in this passage is that neither the modes, their 
essences nor their ideas are distinct from the attributes until they come to exist. That is, the modes 
(or essences of modes) are particulars, distinct from the attributes and from each other, only when 
they exist temporally” (Jarrett, “The Development of Spinoza’s Conception of Immortality,” 162).
29 See, however, Huenemann, “The Middle Spinoza,” 219.
30 KV I 1 | G I/18/13–14 | C 64.
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strongly suggests that no nature or essence can destroy its possessor—the 
“itself” here is most probably that what an essence determines.31 This is con-
firmed by a much later passage stating “[f]or nothing by its own nature seeks its 
own destruction.”32 These passages prefigure E3p4, “[n]o thing can be destroyed 
except through an external cause.” So we know what things do not do in virtue 
of their essences: they do not act in self-destructive ways. Destructive factors 
must come from outside, and it is presumably the essence that draws the bound-
ary between the inside and the outside.
In the Short Treatise, the discussion on causation largely focuses on God’s 
causality. One of the major points—if not the major point—Spinoza wants to 
drive home is that God is the immanent or internal cause.33 This is made clear 
already before the analysis of God’s causality in the third chapter of the first 
part—“outside God, there is nothing, [. . .] he is an immanent cause”34—and 
much in the two dialogues revolves around this.35 The way in which Theophilus 
puts the discussion concerning the immanent or internal cause in essential-
ist terms, “[t] he essence of a thing does not increase through its union with 
another thing,”36 indicates that it is precisely the essence that is the internal 
cause. Moreover, in the discussion it is made clear that an essence makes a 
whole with its effects and does not change in causing the effects.37
So in virtue of his essence, God is the immanent cause of his effects. But does the 
same model apply to finite things? When Spinoza begins to discuss striving—prima 
facie a causal notion—of finite things, this would seem to be the case:
For it is evident that no thing, through its own nature, could strive for 
its own destruction, but that on the contrary, each thing in itself  has a 
striving to preserve itself  in its state, and bring itself  to a better one.38
However, it may still be asked, in what sense is this striving causal? And what is 
its relation to God’s immanent causality? Here the following passage is highly 
relevant:
Freedom of the Will is completely inconsistent with a continuous 
creation, viz. that the same action is required in God to preserve [a thing] 
31 For an analysis of the phrases a se and in se in the Ethics, see my Spinoza’s Geometry of 
Power, 69–73.
32 KV II 17 | G I/86/14–15 | C 127, emphasis added.
33 “[A] n immanent or internal cause (which is all one, according to me)” (KV II 26 | G 
I/110/22–23 | C 148).
34 KV I 2 | G I/26/18–19 | C 72.
35 See esp. G I/30/20–31 | C 76.
36 G I/31/29–30 | C 77.
37 G/31/30 | C 77. “The whole is only a being of reason” “made of various united individuals” 
(I/32–33, emphasis added). It should be noted that remaining unchanged in causing one’s effects 
is a traditional mark of the emanative cause.
38 KV I 5 | G I/40/7–10 | C 84. See also KV II 7 | G I/68/8–9 | C 110.
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in being as to create it, and that without this action the thing could 
not exist for a moment. If  this is so, nothing can be attributed to [the 
will]. But one must say that God has created it as it is; for since it has no 
power to preserve itself while it exists, much less can it produce something 
through itself. If  someone should say, therefore, that the soul produces the 
volition of itself, I ask: from what power? Not from that which was, for 
that no longer exists. Nor from that which it now has, for it does not have 
any by which it could exist or endure for the least moment, because it is 
continuously created. So because there is no thing which has any power to 
preserve itself or to produce anything, the only conclusion left is that God 
alone is, and must be, the efficient cause of all things, and that all Volitions 
are determined by him.39
This sounds very occasionalistic indeed. Given this, it seems rather obvious 
that, strictly speaking, finite things have no power of their own. The following 
striking statement is in line with this:
[W] e are truly God’s servants—indeed, his slaves [. . .]. For if  we were left 
to ourselves, and so did not depend on God, there would be very little, or 
nothing, that we could accomplish[.]40
Despite this, there are passages in which Spinoza talks about finite things in 
seemingly causal terms. For instance, he says that “[t] he more essence a thing 
has, the more it also has of action and the less of passion.”41 Moreover,
[s] ince God’s essence is infinite, it has an infinite action, and an infinite 
negation of passion [.  .  .]; consequently, the more things, through their 
greater essence, are united with God, the more they also have of action, 
and the less of passion[.]42
Still more important, there are also places in which Spinoza talks about causal 
powers of finite things, at least about that of mind: “[I] t [the intellect] can pro-
duce ideas in itself, and outside itself  effects agreeing well with its nature”; 
“from what has been said it is also clear which things are in our power and are 
subjected to no external causes.”43 When this and the claims concerning striving 
are read together with the passage invoking occasionalism, it seems that there is 
a notable tension in Spinoza’s thought about these matters.
I would suggest that we understand the issue as follows. Evidently, God is 
the only true cause. Through their essences, some things can be said to be more 
39 KV II 16 | G I/82/23–38 | C 123, emphases added.
40 KV II 18 | G I/87/5–9 | C 127–128.
41 KV II 26 | G I/110/8–9 | C 147.
42 KV II 26 | G I/111/5–10 | C 148.
43 KV II 26 | G I/112/9–16 | C 149.
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united than others with this cause and thus to be more active.44 But from this 
it does not follow that they would be causes, properly speaking. This would, 
in turn, explain Spinoza’s curious way of talking about essences of things as 
allowing of degrees: we have already encountered the phrase “more essence,” 
which occurs in several places.45 This strikes me as a cumbersome expression, 
and one may wonder why Spinoza adopts it—why does he not just say that 
one thing has more power than another? One possible explanation for this is 
that because of the occasionalistic tendencies he displays in the Short Treatise, 
Spinoza wants here to avoid talking about finite things’ power, which could 
hardly be understood in non-causal terms. So to render all this as consistent as 
possible with the occasionalism-invoking passage (in KV II 16), I would suggest 
that in the Short Treatise, talk about actions or causal powers of things is, in 
fact, metaphorical. In the final analysis, it is only God who has power, whereas 
finite things have none. It is as if  Spinoza considers the power of the universe in 
terms of a zero-sum game and concludes that since God is omnipotent, there is 
no power left for anything else to have. The following passage is put in terms of 
being, but gives some textual support for this reading: “God alone has being, 
and all other things have no being, but are modes.”46 The claim that modes have 
no being may appear surprising; but as having causal power is one traditional 
mark of real being, this is in fact in concordance with the occasionalistic strain 
of the Short Treatise.
Of course, as we know, in the Ethics this position is emphatically discarded. 
One reason for this might be that it is difficult to see in what sense things can 
be said to “strive” to preserve their existence and even promote it, if  what really 
happens is that God just recreates them anew in certain states. Still a more 
important reason—probably the major reason—for this change, I  would be 
inclined to think, is that Spinoza came to the conclusion that within his monis-
tic system there is no problem in finite things having power of their own: a 
substance can full well cause effects via its properties (or modes);47 God’s abso-
lutely infinite power is modified or “channeled through” (the essences of) finite 
things.48 So, in fact, the monistic framework can offer a rather beautiful solu-
tion to what was called the problem of secondary causation.
44 Ethics contains passages that say that we can participate in God’s nature to a varying 
degree; see E2p49s2 | G II/135/34–35; 4p45c2s; 4app31. I am grateful to Andrew Youpa for point-
ing this out to me.
45 In addition to KV II 26 | G I/110/8 | C 147, see KV II 15 | G I/79/35 | C 120–121; KV II 25 | 
G I/107/30–31 | C 145; KV II 26 | G I/111/8 | C 148. Cf. also: “Those are the actions of men who 
have a great perfection or essence” (KV II 18 | G I/87/28–30 | C 128).
46 KV II 5 | G I/64/20–21 | C 107.
47 On this, see Koistinen, “Causation in Spinoza,” 68.




In this chapter, I have attempted to show that the Short Treatise is to a great 
extent based on, and offers an elaborate expression of, a specific brand of 
essentialist metaphysics. This, in turn, informs us of  the development of 
Spinoza’s thought. It would seem that Spinoza’s notion of  essence remained 
rather stable throughout his career, but its ontological status underwent 
some changes. Moreover and most important, unlike the Short Treatise, the 
Ethics makes it very clear that all essences, not just that of  God, are causally 
efficacious.49
49 I would like to acknowledge that the work on this chapter has been financially supported 
by the Academy of Finland (project numbers 127410 and 275583) and the Turku Institute for 
Advanced Studies.
 
 
